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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation firstly sets out the contemporary legal framework. The contemporary framework 
comprises a constitutional perspective, while also considering current labour legislation such as the 
Employment Equity Act, the Labour Relations Act and the Old Age Act. The study analyses the 
constitutionality of section 187(2)(b) and investigates whether this provision is likely to pass the 
test in terms of the section 36 limitation clause of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. Secondly, a best practice study is conducted with reference to the regulation of retirement in 
Spain and Germany. These jurisdictions’ approaches to retirement are assessed and compared to 
the current South African approach. Lastly, the dissertation provides specific conclusions and 
recommendations relating to a mandatory retirement age in South Africa.  
 
KEY WORDS: 
Retirement; employment; social security; equality; discrimination; age; benefits; elderly; Spain; 
Germany; double bind; best practices; substantive equality; formal equality; social assistance; 
social assurance; human dignity; employment. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Retirement is a relatively modern concept, with its origin in military history.1 Until the late 1800s 
those who had to work for a living, worked their entire lives.2 The Roman Empire is considered to 
be responsible for this concept by providing income to soldiers after work.3 Retirement is an 
inevitable event for all of us, but does our Constitution and legislation however provide sufficient 
protection to us in these instances? Although age is generally associated with wisdom and 
experience, elderly employees are often regarded as “lesser” employees and are generally 
considered more disposable.4 The ultimate aim for employers is to make a profit and one of the 
ways to do so is to cut costs by forcing the elderly workers to retire in order to reduce costs in terms 
of wages or other staff related expenses. The issue of mandatory retirement ages highlights a 
number of key conflicting social issues. These issues concern that, on the one hand people are 
living longer and are therefore often desirous or in need of working well past the traditional 
retirement age,5 whilst, on the other hand, high youth unemployment may necessitate the striking 
of an adequate balance in the distribution of work across the different generations.6 The average 
life expectancy for a male has increased from around 53.7 years in 2002 to around 61.5 years in 
2019. In the same time period, the average female life expectancy increased from around 58 years 
to 67.7 years.7  
 
1.2 Contemporary legal framework 
This dissertation firstly provides an examination into the contemporary legal framework by 
establishing to what extent individuals are protected against age discrimination. This analysis is 
heavily influenced by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter “the 
                                                          
1 Clark, Craig and Wilson “The history of public sector pensions in the United States” 2003 University of Pennsylvania 
Press 1. 
2 Clark, Craig and Wilson (n 1) at 2. 
3 Clark, Craig and Wilson (n 1) at 2. 
4 Bosch “Section 187(2)(b) and the dismissal of older workers – Is the LRA nuanced enough?” 2003 24 ILJ 1283 1296. 
5 Blanpain European Labour Law (2013) 625. 
6 Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA, C-411/05, ECR, 2007, 8531 (European Court of Justice). 
7 Statistics South Africa Mid-year Population Estimates 2019 (2019) 5. 
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Constitution”) as the supreme law of our country.8 In particular, reference is made to the equality 
clause and the potential relevance of age as a listed ground.9 The right of everyone to fair labour 
practices would further necessitate an inquiry into the Constitutional permissibility of depriving 
individuals of a number of labour protections upon reaching the agreed mandatory retirement age. 
 
The analysis of the contemporary legal framework further involves an analysis of a number of 
legislative provisions including, in particular, the role of the Employment Equity Act,10 in the 
prevention of unfair discrimination on the basis of age. In this analysis, this study analyses the 
purpose and effect of section 187(2)(b) of the Labour Relations Act,11 (hereafter “the LRA”) in 
rendering a dismissal on the basis of a mandatory retirement age (which would otherwise be 
automatic unfair) as fair. This study then proceeds to set out the various requirements in order for 
an employer to validly claim a fair dismissal on the basis of a mandatory retirement age and in 
particular how to establish “the normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that 
capacity” at a particular employer. 
 
In addition the study considers contemporary challenges that have arisen in the application of 
section 187(2)(b) of the LRA including the unilateral amendment of the compulsory retirement age 
by certain employers.12 From this an analysis follows on the constitutionality of section 187(2)(b) 
of the LRA. In particular, the extent that the purpose and objects of this provision are linked to a 
rational governmental objective, as part of the balancing exercise between the competing societal 
interests involved. 
 
1.3 Lessons from other jurisdictions 
This study draws from a number of cases in other jurisdictions wherein disputes relating to 
mandatory retirement age provisions have arisen. This is done bearing in mind that section 39 of 
                                                          
8 s 2(1) of the Constitution. 
9 s 9(3) of the Constitution. 
10 Act 55 of 1998. 
11 Act 66 of 1995. 
12 Theunissen v Legal Aid South Africa [2018] ZALCCT 22. 
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the Constitution mandates the consideration of international law and permits the consideration of 
foreign law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.13 Furthermore, having regard to the Labour 
Appeal Court’s finding in NEHAWU v UCT14 where the court held that the interpretation of 
European Union Directives by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) can be of particular value to 
South African courts when called upon to interpret legislative provisions that are similar in content 
to that of the directives, this study considers the similarities between the EEA and the EU Directive 
on equal treatment in occupation and employment.15 
 
In considering the similarities between the EEA and the Directive, the study considers various 
cases heard by the ECJ and the extent to which these cases can offer guidance in the South African 
context. In particular, cases such as Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA16, wherein 
the ECJ held that the aim of promoting access to employment by means of better distribution of 
work between the generations may, in principle, be regarded 
as “objectively and reasonably” justifiable,17 and Gerhard Fuchs v Land Hessen, wherein the ECJ 
considered the fact that a person becomes entitled to a pension upon reaching a mandatory 
retirement age, are particularly important in an assessment of the justifiability of the measure.18 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
This study follows a doctrinal research methodology by critically analysing the contemporary legal 
framework in respect of the regulation of a mandatory retirement age, as well as a best practice 
study focusing on the legal position in respect to retirement law in the European countries of Spain 
and Germany respectively. The study also focusses on the challenges the current legal framework 
faces and provides some recommendations for the future. The study draws on a variety of sources 
including case law, legislation, international legal instruments, various academic articles and 
                                                          
13 s 39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution; see other constitutional sections such as s 232 and s 233. 
14 2002 4 BLLR 311 (LAC). 
15 Council Directive 2000/78/EC. 
16 Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA, C-411/05, ECR, 2007, 8531 (European Court of Justice). 
17 Blanpain (n 5) 628. 
18 Gerhard Fuchs v Land Hessen (C-159/10) ECR 2011 (European Court of Justice). 
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textbooks as well as a variety of other relevant sources including recommendations from civil 
society and best practice in various jurisdictions. 
 
1.4.1 The key objectives of the study 
a)  Identify and analyse the constitutionality of section 187(2)(b) and the socio-economic 
impact of section 187(2)(b) on elderly workers; 
b)  Investigate the socio-economic consequences of discrimination based on age; 
c)  Analyse whether section 187(2)(b) indirectly discriminates against persons on the basis of 
age; and 
d)  Analyse the extent that the right to equality may be limited, with specific reference to age. 
 
1.4.2 Research questions 
i)  Whether the value of achieving equality is upheld with regard to employees nearing the so-
called retirement age? 
ii)  Does section 187(2)(b) reasonably and justifiably limit the right to equality based on age in 
terms of section 36 of the Constitution? 
 
1.4.3 Assumptions 
1)  It is assumed that elderly workers are less productive and therefore indirectly less valuable 
to the employer in the workplace environment. 
2)  Employers tend to exploit section 187(2)(b) to dismiss employees or terminate their 
employment contracts and retain them on a more expendable fixed-term contract basis. 
 
1.5  Framework of the dissertation 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
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This chapter sets out the key issues regarding section 187(2)(b) and retirement in South 
Africa. 
Chapter 2: Contemporary Legal Framework 
This chapter considers South African legislation, such as the Employment Equity Act and 
the Labour Relations Act, as well as numerous judgments which set out the current legal 
position relating to retirement. 
Chapter 3: Lessons from Other Jurisdictions 
This chapter considers the best practices between two European countries, namely Spain 
and Germany, to establish what methods and laws these two countries have in place and 
whether these laws are effective in providing a better future for their elderly workers or 
retirees. 
Chapter 4: Conclusions and Recommendations  
This final chapter provides conclusions as to whether section 187(2)(b) affords sufficient 
protection to employees nearing an agreed or normal retirement age. The chapter reflects 
on the challenges of section 187(2)(b) as set out in the dissertation. With regard to the 
analysis of the two foreign jurisdictions, this chapter also provides specific 
recommendations to ensure adequate protection of elderly workers. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the constitutional backdrop of section 187(2)(b). Within this constitutional 
framework, emphasis is placed on the fact that human dignity encompasses all human rights and 
should be seen, not only as a right, but also as a value.19 Section 9 is critically evaluated in order 
to establish to what extent age discrimination may be reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 
36 of the Constitution. The employment relationship and the importance of balancing interests is 
highlighted by revealing the general unequal relationship between the employee and the 
employer.20 The onus of proof in discrimination cases are set out with reference to the EEA as well 
as the LRA.21 Furthermore, the chapter analyses the function of section 187(2)(b) while also 
evaluating whether this provision should pass constitutional muster. In addition, similarities and 
differences between the LRA and the EEA in respect of discriminatory dismissals are pointed out. 
The dissertation then goes on to reflect on the legal positions as found in the international as well 
as the regional framework. 
 
2.2 The constitutional framework 
In the labour market, we find the competing interests of the employee on the one hand, with certain 
rights and duties afforded to them by virtue of the position they hold, and the employer on the other 
hand with rights and duties of their own.22 The employer, in most cases finds himself with a 
significant stronghold over the employee, who looks to the employer to satisfy his/her socio-
economical needs by providing the employer with services and the skills required to perform the 
task at hand and ultimately produce a profit for the employer.23 Generally, the employer has more 
resources than the employee, who in turn is in need of financial stability. In light of this, an 
employment relationship is often seen as an unequal one. 
                                                          
19 s 10 of the Constitution. 
20 Alon-Shenker “The unequal right to age equality: Towards a dignified lives approach to age discrimination” 2012 
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 25 277. 
21 s 6 of the EEA and s 187(1)(f) of the LRA. 
22 Cooper “A constitutional reading of the test for unfair discrimination in labour law” 2001 Acta Juridica 121 139. 
23 Davies and Freedland (eds) Kahn-Freud’s Labour and the Law (1983) 11. 
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The concept of fairness requires a balancing of interests, on the one hand, the effect of the conduct 
on the employee against the justification given by the employer for the action on the other.24 Van 
Niekerk suggests that fairness should not merely be a mechanical application of a formula to a 
certain set of facts, but rather that a more dynamic approach should be followed.25 In an attempt to 
balance the interests of the employee and the employer, the South African legislature has put 
mechanisms in place, by way of legislation, to safeguard employees from being exploited and 
abused by these “all powerful” employers.26 Due to the over-arching rights-based approach 
followed by the South African labour laws, the point of departure in all matters concerning labour 
law should be our supreme law, the Constitution.27 The Constitutional Court has stated that the 
ability to earn money and support oneself is an important component of the right to human dignity 
and without it persons face “humiliation and degradation”.28   
 
Two of the core values on which the Constitution is based are human dignity and the achievement 
of equality. The equality clause enshrined in section 9 of our Constitution provides that no person 
may be discriminated against, whether directly or indirectly, on certain listed grounds, one of which 
being age.29 At this juncture it is important to distinguish between direct and indirect 
discrimination. Direct discrimination “arises when the criteria on which the differentiation is based 
are themselves unfair”.30 In the matter between Swart v Mr. Video (Pty) Ltd the court found that 
the employer directly discriminated against the job applicant by stipulating that all candidates must 
be between the ages of 18 and 25.31 Indirect discrimination “occurs when criteria are fair in form 
but produce inequitable results”.32 
  
                                                          
24 Davies and Freedland (n 23) at 139. 
25 Van Niekerk “The Labour Courts, fairness and the rule of law” 2015 36 ILJ 2457. 
26 Examples would be the legislation giving effect to s 23 of the Constitution, namely, the Labour Relations Act of 66 
of 1995; the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
27 s 2(1) of the Constitution. 
28 South African Informal Traders Forum v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 SA 371 (CC) par 31; This case dealt with a 
particular group of vulnerable workers. 
29 s 9 of the Constitution. 
30 Van Niekerk and Smit Law@Work (2018) 130. 
31 1998 19 ILJ 1315 (CCMA) 1317. 
32 Van Niekerk and Smit (n 30) 131. 
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The right to equality may be limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. In terms of section 
36, a right may only be limited in terms of the law of general application and must be reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity equality and freedom, 
taking into consideration the following factors: “the nature of the right; the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the limitation; the relation between the limitation 
and its purpose; and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.”33 A key human right, which is 
the focal point in the limitation analysis provided by section 36, is the right to human dignity.34 
The right to human dignity is not only a fundamental right, but also a constitutional value, which 
informs the interpretation of many, if not all, rights.35 Therefore, when analysing if the limitation 
of the right in terms of section 9 in respect of age is reasonable and justifiable as provided for in 
section 36, we must do so against the backdrop of the fundamental constitutional value and right 
of human dignity. 
 
The consequence of age being a listed ground is that it affects the burden of proof when determining 
unfair discrimination in an employment context.36 Section 23(1) of the Constitution which states 
that everyone has the right to fair labour practices, is a so-called “umbrella right” that has far 
reaching effects on the contractual relationship between the parties in respect of the employment 
relationship.37 Another fundamental right that must be considered together with section 23 of the 
Constitution, is the right to social security protection enshrined in section 27(1)(c) of the 
Constitution.38 This right goes so far as to place an obligation on the state to provide for the 
progressive realisation of the rights contained in section 27.39 It is submitted that the Constitution 
envisages that legislative and other measures will be the primary instrument for the achievement 
of social and economic rights.40 In the Constitutional Court judgment in Mazibuko & Others v City 
                                                          
33 s 36 of the Constitution. 
34 Dawood & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) par 35. 
35 Dawood case (n 34) par 35; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality & Another v Minister of Justice & 
Others 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) at par 120. 
36 s 11 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
37 s 23(1) of the Constitution; Fedlife Assurance Limited v Wolfaardt 2001 22 ILJ 247 par 14. 
38 s 27 of the Constitution. 
39 s 27(2) of the Constitution. 
40 2010 3 BCLR 239 (CC) par 66. 
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of Johannesburg,41 the court held that progressive realisation imposes a duty on government to 
continue to review its policies to ensure the achievement of the right is progressively realised. It is 
submitted that the state pension provided to retired employees is not up to standard and, as a result, 
senior employees are forced to remain in the labour market for longer in order to sustain their 
income. Accordingly, as per Justice O’Reagan’s judgment in the Mazibuku matter, social security 
policies that provide poor post-employment support should be reviewed in line with this 
constitutional imperative.42 
 
The Constitutional Court has consistently placed emphasis on the fact that the Constitution seeks 
more than the application of formal equality, but rather substantive equality.43 Formal equality 
requires that all persons are equal bearers of rights.44 Substantive equality goes further by 
examining the actual socio-economic conditions of all persons in order to determine whether the 
commitment to equality is upheld.45 Accordingly, substantive equality provides a pro-active 
approach by, not only ensuring that past discriminatory laws are removed, but also ensuring actual 
practical advancement towards a more equal society as envisaged by our Constitution.46 It is 
submitted that when determining unfairness, within the constitutional sphere, the ultimate impact 
of the conduct on the individual and his/her dignity is of vital importance.47 
 
It is important to note, that one may not directly rely on the Constitution in the event of a labour 
dispute, due to the so-called subsidiarity principle.48 This principle entails that a person may not 
bypass legislation giving effect to a certain provision contained in the Constitution and directly 
                                                          
41 Mazibuko case (n 40). 
42 Mazibuko case (n 40) at par 67. 
43 Minister of Constitutional Development and Another v South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners 
Association and Others 2018 5 SA 349 (CC) . 
44 Minister of Constitutional Development and Another v South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners (n 
43) at par 62. 
45 Minister of Constitutional Development and Another v South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners (n 
43) at par 61. 
46 Bonthuys “Equal choices for women and other disadvantaged groups” in Jagwanth and Kalula (eds) Equality 
Law: Reflections from South Africa and Elsewhere (2002) 60; Freedman Understanding the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (2013) 368. 
47  Cooper (n 22) at 139. 
48 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence (CCT27/98) (1999) ZACC 7. 
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rely on the Constitution for the relevant remedy sought.49 The applicable legislation giving effect 
to section 9 of the Constitution, as far as the employment relationship is concerned, is the 
Employment Equity Act (hereafter the “EEA”).50 As a general rule, a dismissal based on age, will 
amount to an automatic unfair dismissal as contained in the LRA.51 The exception, however, to the 
aforementioned general rule is found in section 187(2)(b), which states that a dismissal based on 
age may be fair, provided that the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age. 
 
2.3 The Labour Relations Act 
The LRA was enacted to give effect to the constitutional right to fair labour practices. The 
substantive objectives of this act are to include economic development, social justice and labour 
peace.52 Bosch, points out that it may be argued that the function of section 187(2)(b) is merely to 
qualify section 187(1)(f) by preventing dismissals based on age from being viewed as unfairly 
discriminatory.53 If a person is unable to earn an income due to the termination of their services 
upon reaching the normal or agreed retirement age, this may undermine the social justice objective 
which the Labour Relations Act aims to achieve by leaving the already vulnerable elderly workers 
with no protection when their employment comes to an end. 
 
In terms of South African law, the employee may agree to a certain retirement age in two ways, 
either by way of a clause in terms of his or her employment contract, or by way of a collective 
agreement.54 An agreement made by way of an employment contract may prove to be problematic. 
This is because labour legislation is moving towards an employment relationship centred approach, 
rather than the contract centred approach.55 Scholars have long agreed that legislative intervention 
                                                          
49 Murcot and Van der Westhuizen “The ebb and flow of the application of the principle of subsidiarity – Critical 
reflections on Motau and My Vote Counts” 2015 Constitutional Court Review 43 44. 
50 Act 55 of 1998. 
51 Act 66 of 1995; Schweitxer v Waco Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1998 19 ILJ 1573 (LC) par 14. 
52 s 1 of the LRA. 
53 Bosch (n 4) 1287. 
54 Bosch (n 4) 1289. 
55 However, the Labour Court in MEC for the Department of Health, Eastern Cape v Odendaal, held that, 
notwithstanding the fact that the employment relationship is influenced by legislation, collective bargaining and the 
constitutional imperative of fair labour practices, the contract of employment nevertheless remains the basis of such 
relationship. The continued relevance of the contract of employment is also shown by the jurisdictional muddle that 
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is the most effective way of addressing shortcomings in the common law.56 It is therefore hardly 
surprising that a significant number of laws have been enacted in order to address the perceived 
deficiencies in the protection of workers vis-à-vis the common law of contract.57 The reason for 
this is that a contract in general is based on agreement between both parties on equal footing, 
however, in reality, as Cohen submits, generally, the will of the employer, which is placed with 
more bargaining power than that of the employee, is ultimately reflected in the employment 
contract.58 The move towards the realisation of greater protection of job security, rather than blindly 
following the common law, was emphasised by Zondo JP (as he then was) in the case of Aviation 
Union of South Africa and Others v South African Airways (Pty) Limited an Others,59 in relation 
to section 197 of the LRA. Accordingly, this case illustrates how legislation has played a role in 
the protection of employees’ rights. On appeal, the Constitutional Court emphasised section 3 of 
the LRA, which mandates that any person interpreting the LRA must do so in conformity with the 
Constitution and public international law whilst giving effect to the LRA’s primary objectives.60 
 
Section 187(2)(b) forms part of Chapter VIII of the LRA which addresses unfair dismissal and 
unfair labour practices. Although, the provision is included in the dismissal chapter of the LRA, 
the courts and tribunals have generally regarded it as an instance of termination of employment 
falling short of the definitional requirements of a dismissal in terms of section 186(1) of the LRA.61 
The LRA makes provision for two forms of dismissal, namely, unfair dismissals and automatically 
unfair dismissals.62 For a dismissal to be fair, the dismissal must be both substantively and 
procedurally fair.63 A dismissal, as defined in section 186(1)(a) of the LRA, has occurred when an 
                                                          
occasionally arises where dual avenues for resolving disputes arise from s 77(3) of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act. There have also been instances in which the employment contract confers greater rights upon an 
employee, such as the case of Ramabulana v Pilansberg Platinum Mines (2015 36 ILJ 2333 (LC) wherein the 
employment contract provided a stronger right to a pre-dismissal hearing. 
56 Van Staden “The role of the judiciary in balancing flexibility and security” 2013 De Jure 470 471. 
57 Van Staden and Smit “The regulation of the employment relationship and the re-emergence of the contract of 
employment” 2010 TSAR 702 706. 
58 Cohen “The relational contract of employment” 2012 Acta Juridica 84 85. 
59 2010 4 SA 604 (LAC) par 30. 
60 Aviation Union of South Africa and Another v SAA (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 1 SA 321 (CC) par 34.  
61 Rieger Fairness of Termination of Employment Due to Old Age (Dissertation UP 2012) 18; Schweitser v Waco 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1998 19 ICJ 1573 (LC). The court reiterated that there is no dismissal when an employee’s 
contract of employment terminates by virtue of it having attained the “normal or agreed retirement age”.   
62 ss 186 and 187 of the LRA. 
63 Van Niekerk and Smit (n 30) 238.  
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“employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without notice”.64 In order to establish 
whether a dismissal is substantively fair, the reason for the dismissal must be considered.65 The 
main difference between these two forms of dismissal is the onus of proof regarding the dismissal.  
 
In disputes relating to an unfair dismissal in terms of section 186, the onus is on the employee to 
prove that there is in fact a dismissal. Section 192 of the LRA sets out the onus of proof in dismissal 
disputes.  Once the dismissal has been established by the employee, the onus shifts to the employer 
to prove that the dismissal was fair.66 However, in terms of section 187 a dismissal, simply by 
virtue of a specified reason for the dismissal (for example age), is unfair and accordingly the onus 
shifts to the employer to prove that such a dismissal is in fact fair.67 In instances where section 
187(2)(b) is applicable, an unfortunate event may occur where, if it is found that the employee has 
reached a normal or agreed retirement age, the dismissal will be automatically fair. However, where 
it is found that the employee has not reached the agreed or normal retirement age, it will lead to an 
automatically unfair dismissal and the employer could be liable to pay a maximum of 24 months 
compensation instead of 12 months compensation in cases of section 186 dismissals.68 The 
difference in compensation limits is because automatically unfair dismissals are based on the listed 
grounds and/or arbitrary grounds as set out in section 187 – in contrast to other unfair dismissals 
which may be seen as “less serious”.69  Considering the aforesaid, an inconsistent interpretation of 
section 187(2)(b) may result in unfair consequences for both the employer and/or the employee. 
On the one hand, the employee, who is vulnerable due to his or her age, may be dismissed as a 
result of a factor which does not directly impact their work performance. On the other hand, the 
employer may have to keep an elderly employee on in the workplace for longer, even though the 
employee’s quality of work has deteriorated. 
After the court has found that the dismissal was indeed unfair, section 193 of the LRA provides for 
three possible remedies namely, re-instatement, re-employment or compensation.70 Re-
                                                          
64 s 186 of the LRA. 
65 Schweitzer v Waco Distributors (n 51) at par 13. 
66 Phumgela v Van Der Merwe 2011 7 BALR 785 (CCMA) 788; The standard of proof that is required is on a balance 
of probabilities. 
67 s 192 of the LRA. 
68 s 194 of the LRA. 
69 Van Niekerk and Smit Law@Work (2020) 271.  
70 s 193 of the LRA.  
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employment is generally the primary remedy in unfair dismissal matters.71 However, the court or 
commissioner must first establish whether the employee can be re-instated or re-employed and 
cannot order compensation before such a consideration has taken place. Compensation can only be 
ordered if the court or commissioner finds that: the employee does not wish to be re-instated or re-
employed; the circumstances surrounding the dismissal has made the employment relationship 
intolerable; it is not reasonably practicable for the employer to re-instate or re-employ the 
employee; or that the dismissal was unfair only due to the employer’s lack of procedural fairness.72 
The Labour Court has held that once employees had established that there was indeed 
discrimination, the onus shifts to the employer to show that the dismissal was not unfair.73 The 
court went further in stating that, in order for the employer to show that the dismissal was in fact 
fair, the object of the policy or practice had to be legitimate and the means used must be rational 
and proportional.74 
 
2.3 The impact of South African social security law on labour law  
The core motive for senior employees seeking to remain in the labour market for longer is because 
they are generally unable to support themselves after retirement. Although the state provides public 
funds in the form of grants, these funds are largely insufficient and unsustainable.75 Social security 
measures, such as increased old age grants, housing for the elderly and adequate health care 
facilities, should therefore be put in place to provide adequate protection to these vulnerable 
persons in our society. If sustainable measures are put in place, retirement would be made more 
appealing to employees, which could lead to new avenues for youth employment and ultimately 
improve the economy. However, without these measures, people who are dismissed after reaching 
an agreed or normal retirement age, are faced with the prospect of poverty, which is already an 
ever increasing reality in South Africa. Fortunately, our Constitution places socio-economic rights 
                                                          
71 Van Niekerk and Smit (n 30) 263. 
72 s 193(2)(a) – (d).  
73 Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler 1997 11 BLLR 1438 (LC) at 286. 
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on equal footing with civil and political rights.76 The effect of having to retire without social 
assistance or protection, is not only degrading, but also goes to the foundation of a person’s human 
dignity. This was reiterated and emphasised in our apex court, where the court held that “there can 
be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of our society, are 
denied to those who have no food, clothing or shelter. Affording socio-economic rights to all people 
therefore enables them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in our Constitution”.77 
 
In the year 2017, the older persons grant had the second highest number of beneficiaries of all 
social grants in South Africa with the beneficiaries amounting to 3 369 513.78 Currently, the value 
of the older persons grant that one may receive if you are older than 60 years but less than 75 years 
old is R 1 780. However, this amount increases to R 1 800 if you are older than 75 years.79 At the 
going rate of inflation and South Africa’s current economic position, this grant seems to be far 
from sustainable, even though it is higher in value than compared to the other social assistance 
grants provided in South Africa.80 Therefore, the older persons grant system seems to work more 
efficiently than other grants, but still faces problems such as maladministration and corruption, 
which diminishes the aims set out in the Old Age Act as well as the constitutional values 
surrounding social justice.  
 
2.5 The international and regional framework 
Social Security Convention, No. 102, sets out the minimum standards in terms of inter alia medical 
care, old age benefits, unemployment benefits and sickness benefits.81 The ILO defines social 
security as “the protection that a society provides for individuals and households to ensure access 
to healthcare and to guarantee income security, particularly in cases of old-age, unemployment, 
sickness, invalidity, work injury, maternity or loss of a breadwinner”.82 The ILO has introduced a 
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77 The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) at par 23. 
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concept called the “minimum floor” concept, which essentially entails that “a certain minimum 
level of social protection needs to be an accepted and undisputed part of the socio-economic floor 
of the global economy”.83 There are four key guarantees which encapsulates the social protection 
floor, namely, access to essential health care; income security for children; assistance for the 
unemployed and poor; and income security for the elderly and persons with disabilities.84 As a 
member state of the Southern African Development Community (“SADC”), South Africa is bound 
to implement the principles and objectives of the SADC Treaty.85 The Treaty provides the 
framework for member states to co-ordinate, harmonise and rationalise their policies and strategies 
for sustainable development in all areas of human endeavour.86 Unlike other Southern African 
countries who follow a universal scheme based approach to social assistance, South Africa follows 
a means test based approach to social assistance in relation to offering social grants to indigent 
elderly members of the population.87 Social assistance is funded by the state, which, if 
maladministered, poses a further challenge to social justice.88 Social insurance refers to a 
mandatory contributory system, or regulated private sector provision, concerned with the spreading 
of income over the life cycle or the pooling of risks.89 Social assistance refers to state provided 
basic minimum protection to relieve poverty, essentially subject to qualifying criteria on a non-
contributory basis.90 
 
There are three main points of criticism aimed at these non-contributory based schemes. Firstly, 
because these schemes are largely territorial and nationality-based, their scope of coverage is 
limited.91 Secondly, the monetary benefits are generally low and often fail to enable persons to live 
above the breadline.92 Lastly, these schemes face further challenges such as the rising rates of 
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corruption and fraud in the region.93 In an attempt to address the limited coverage of these schemes, 
South Africa has taken a pro-active step by widening the old-age grant by equalising the age of 
eligibility at 60 years for both men and women.94 However, the Older Persons Act defines an older 
person as a man of 65 years and a woman of 60 years.95 The act aims to provide for a democratic 
society based on social justice and fundamental human rights and seeks to improve the quality of 
life of all citizens and to free the potential of all persons.96 Although these aims directly correlate 
with our constitutional values, we must however ensure that the elderly are well looked after 
subsequent to retirement in order to achieve these aims. 
 
The ILO’s Termination of Employment Recommendation 166 of 1982 provides that age should 
not be a valid reason for the termination of employment.97 The United Nations has placed emphasis 
on a new approach whereby employers should favour more flexible retirement policies and 
practices, while maintaining acquired pension rights.98 The United Nations endorses the principle 
that older workers should be allowed to work as long as they are capable of doing so productively.99 
Article 21 of the Older Workers Recommendation, 162 of 1980 states that, wherever possible, the 
transition from a working life to that of retirement should be voluntary and that age qualifications 
for old-age pension should be flexible. In light of the aforesaid ILO provision, section 187(2)(b) 
should be interpreted to promote a more flexible retirement approach and to encourage older 
workers to work for longer, provided that they do so productively. 
 
2.6 Employment Equity Act 
Alon Shenker, correctly points out that age discrimination is often considered less harmful than 
other grounds of discrimination and is frequently regarded as permissible, legitimate or 
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economically efficient.100 Therefore, it is often the case where an employee, in dire need of work 
in order to sustain a living, would succumb to the terms of the employment contract. This notion 
is prevalent on both sides of the spectrum – for young job seekers seeking first time employment, 
as well as senior employees seeking to remain in the labour market for longer in order to 
substantiate an already low old age grant. According to Stats SA, the first quarter of 2019 (Jan – 
March) reflected a youth (between the ages of 15 – 24) unemployment rate of 55,2% and 
unemployment amongst senior employees (between the ages of 55 – 64) at a rate of 10,1 %.101 This 
may be an indication that a compulsory retirement age may be justifiable, in so far as it provides 
more vacancies to those seeking first time employment. This generational balance is also known 
as the “double bind” principle.102  
 
The aim of the EEA is to “achieve equity in the workplace by promoting equal opportunity and fair 
treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair discrimination; and to implement 
affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by designated 
groups”.103 One of the provisions aimed to promote these aforementioned objectives is section 6 
of the EEA, which deals with prohibition of unfair discrimination. Section 6(1) sets out the listed 
grounds upon which a person may not discriminate, namely, “race, gender sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language, birth or any arbitrary 
ground”.104 What is meant by an “arbitrary” ground has been the subject of much debate, however, 
the court in Ndulula and Others v Metrorail,105 stated that an arbitrary ground refers to an unlisted 
ground or a ground which is analogous to the listed grounds.  Nearly the exact same grounds are 
found in section 187(1)(f) of the LRA. In terms of sections 187(1)(f), a dismissal is automatically 
unfair if the reason for the dismissal is: 
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“that the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or indirectly, on 
any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, 
culture, language, marital status or family responsibility.”106 
 
McGregor correctly points out that arbitrary grounds should be interpreted within the broader 
context of discrimination with emphasis placed on human dignity.107 Section 6(2)(a) – (b) of the 
EEA provides for the defences that may be used in discrimination cases, namely, the inherent 
requirement of a job and affirmative action. In terms of section 187(2)(a) – (b) of the LRA, the Act 
provides for actions by the employer which will not be considered as automatically unfair, namely 
if the dismissal is based on an inherent requirement of a job or if the employee has reached a normal 
or agreed retirement age.108 It is important to note that in terms of the EEA, retirement age is not 
seen as a defence to discrimination, however, the LRA makes provision for an employer to dismiss 
an employee on the basis of an agreed retirement age. Both the LRA and the EEA construe age as 
a listed ground for unfair discrimination and therefore it appears that section 187(1)(b) is in contrast 
with these anti-discriminatory provisions contained in both the LRA and EEA.109 Ultimately, the 
EEA contains the most inclusive list of specified grounds and therefore offers the broadest 
protection.110 
 
Furthermore, elderly employees are seen to be less valuable or less competent to work or perform 
certain tasks, which increases the generational imbalance.111 This approach may lead to 
discrimination. What is discrimination? More specifically, what is unfair discrimination? Firstly, 
discrimination occurs when people are not treated as individuals or when characteristics are 
assigned to people which amount to generalised assumptions.112 Secondly, the Constitutional Court 
defines unfair discrimination as “treating people differently in a way which impairs their 
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fundamental dignity as human beings, who are inherently equal in dignity”.113 It is submitted that 
the determining factor when establishing whether discrimination amounts to unfair discrimination, 
is the impact that the discrimination has on its victims.114 Generally, discriminatory treatment that 
burdens people in a disadvantaged position is most likely unfair.115  
 
2.7 Basing the normal retirement age upon inherent job requirements 
2.7.1 The concept of an inherent job requirement 
Inherent job requirements are generally where a certain task or job requires certain characteristics 
from a person to complete the task sufficiently.116 It is based on this ground that employers may 
justify dismissing an employee based on his or her old age due to the fact that they may no longer 
be able to perform certain tasks that the job require. However, it has been submitted that reaching 
a certain chronological age is not in itself sufficient to justify a dismissal based on the inherent 
requirements of a job.117 In the past, is has been found that matters of discrimination are difficult 
to prove and, therefore, the legislature has tailored the burden of proof by shifting the onus in 
discrimination disputes in order to ease the burden which would otherwise have been placed solely 
on the grievant.118 Landman correctly points out that the EEA does not allow persons to pursue a 
dispute relying merely on alleged discrimination – such matters should be approached in terms of 
the provisions of the LRA.119 Accordingly, the onus falls on the employer to either establish that 
no discrimination took place, or that the discrimination is justified.120 The Labour Court has held 
that the mere averment of discrimination is not enough to shift the onus.121 In order to qualify as 
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unfair discrimination, a link must be shown between the differentiating treatment or impact and an 
unacceptable ground of justification.122 A good example of the justifiability of discrimination based 
on age as an inherent job requirement may be found in POPCRU on Behalf of Baadjies v The South 
African Police Service.123 In this case the Commissioner had to determine whether the fact that a 
prospective employee had to be between the ages of 18 and 33 years, fell within the ambits of the 
inherent requirements of the job in question. However, the employer did not provide the 
Commissioner with any reasons as to why this specific age bracket was part of an inherent job 
requirement. Accordingly, the Commissioner found that the discrimination was unfair and the 
employer was forced to employ the applicant.124 
 
It is submitted that, due to the age of elderly employees, they often find themselves in a 
disadvantaged position in the workplace and are more prone to discrimination.125 This 
discrimination is largely based on general assumptions that older employees are less productive.126 
It has been said that the difficulty with age related reform is the perceived lower productivity of 
older workers. In addition, training programs are also largely aimed at younger employees because 
the costs involved in training employees may not be justified with regard to employees facing 
imminent retirement.127 Another significant problem is that it is difficult to individualise the various 
manifestations of ageing.128 Peoples’ capacities differ and some may be able to work at higher 
productivity levels for longer periods than others.  
 
Therefore, irrespective of age, the test should be whether the employee in question can perform the 
tasks required by the particular job. If the answer to the latter question is in the affirmative, then 
such a dismissal is an automatic unfair dismissal based on age. If the answer to the latter question 
is in the negative, then the dismissal might be justifiable. It must be stressed that it is the inability 
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to perform certain tasks that justifies the particular dismissal and not reaching a particular age. It 
was correctly pointed out in the Industrial Court, as it then was, that “there is nothing to indicate 
why a worker of say 50 years old is still not fit and agile or even fitter or even more agile than that 
of a worker of say 40 years”.129 The criteria should therefore have been a fitness and agility test 
and not an old age test.130 In the international sphere, measures have already been put in place for 
age related reform such as increasing the official retirement age.131  
 
2.7.2 Determining the normal retirement age in the absence of an agreed retirement age 
Labuschagne correctly points out that section 187(2)(b) raises a few concerns: what if the parties 
have not agreed to a normal retirement age; or does it constitute a dismissal if the employer chooses 
to dismiss the employee, not on, but after the normal retirement age; or would an agreed retirement 
age be constitutional?132 There seems to be a lack of guidance in our law in respect of retirement 
law or, more specifically, the interpretation of section 187(2)(b). No other labour legislation makes 
mention of what the criteria might be for a normal retirement age or provides for a prescribed 
retirement age. Section 5 of the EEA also provides that an employer must take all reasonable steps 
to promote equal opportunities in the workplace by eliminating unfair discrimination in any 
employment policy or practice. It can be argued that the implementation of an agreed retirement 
age may result in a policy which undermines equal opportunities in the workplace. The same can 
be said for employees who have reached a certain age and are kept on fixed term contracts. In the 
Dingler case,133 the court found that the company failed to provide any financial or business reasons 
for their policy. Consequently, the court held that the policy was an arbitrary ground for dismissal. 
 
The first case to deal with the pivotal question at hand was the case of Schmahmann v Concept 
Communications Natal (Pty) Limited.134 Upon reaching the age of 65 years, the employer required 
the employee to retire. The employee argued that there was no agreed retirement in place and 
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therefore, she should be able to continue to work. The court, however, found that one can assume 
that the normal retirement age for a bookkeeper would be 65 years.135 Accordingly, the court held 
that the dismissal was fair and in line with section 187(2)(b). The court erred in its judgment by 
equating a “normal” retirement age with that of an agreed retirement age.136 Section 187(2)(b) 
clearly distinguishes between a normal and an agreed retirement age. Therefore, a possible 
suggestion is made to the legislature to rather incorporate a competency-based approach to section 
187(2)(b). In Johane v Rand Mine Milling & Mining,137  the court found that there can be no agreed 
retirement age if, during the employee’s employment, the employer introduced pension and 
provident funds indicating a retirement age of 60 years and the employee refused to join those 
funds. The employer’s “general practice” with regard to retiring employees has proved to be an 
acceptable approach to determine a “normal” retirement age.138 Therefore, an important factor to 
consider when determining the “normal” retirement age, is the practice in the industry in which the 
employee operates.139 An agreed retirement age would therefore be one where the employee and 
employer have, either expressly or tacitly, agreed to a certain age of retirement.140 
 
A more acceptable approach was followed in the case of Gqibitole v Pace Community College.141 
Once again, there was no agreed retirement age between the parties and the employee, a teacher, 
was dismissed close to the age of 68 years based on the fact that the age of 60 years is purportedly 
the “normal” retirement age for teachers. The court found that there was no legal basis to support 
the employer’s submission that 60 years of age is in fact the normal age for teachers to retire and 
accordingly found that the dismissal was unfair and not in accordance with section 187(2)(b) of the 
LRA. Considering the aforesaid, it becomes clear that there is significant inconsistencies when 
determining what a “normal age” of retirement is. In the Schmahmann case it was believed that the 
age of 65 years was the normal retirement age for bookkeepers, but in the case of Gqibitole, the 
age of 60 years was regarded as the normal retirement age. It is therefore, reiterated that the test 
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should be one of competency and capability, taking into account the nature of the job, and not one 
of age. 
 
Various judgments have held that a dismissal based on age, after the attainment of an agreed or 
normal retirement age, does not constitute unfair dismissal. One such case is the matter between 
Schweitzer v Waco Distributors (a division of Noltex (Pty) Limited).142 The court held that section 
187(2)(b) pronounces on the fairness of a dismissal based on age by providing three inherent 
requirements in order for such a dismissal to be fair, namely: “a) the dismissal must be based on 
age; b) the employer must have an agreed or normal retirement age; and c) the employee must have 
reached the age referred to in b) above.”143 
 
This approach has been severely criticised by both Grogan and Labuschagne.144 Grogan 
emphasises that this approach is illogical, as the court in this particular matter does not address his 
own concerns regarding “the unfairness of giving employers the carte blanche to dismiss 
employees whom they have permitted to work beyond the retirement age”.145 Labuschagne agrees 
and states that this reasoning is unconstitutional because, bar the absence of other grounds of 
justification, such conduct would amount to an unfair labour practice.146 
 
Bosch147 follows a more acceptable approach, arguing that the purpose of section 187(2)(b) is to 
qualify section 187(1)(f). This argument is supported by the judgment of Rubenstein v Prince 
Daelite (Pty) Limited.148 Section 187(1)(f) provides for automatically unfair dismissal on the basis 
of unfair discriminated against the employee on any arbitrary ground, one of which being age.149 
He further argues that the fairness enquiry should not end here, as the court in the Schweitzer case 
would suggest, but rather urges the court to delve further by taking into account the fairness of the 
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dismissal based on the terms set out in section 188 of the LRA.150 However, Labuschagne states 
that section 187(2)(b) is not subject to the interpretation that Bosch suggests.151 
 
It is submitted that section 187(2)(b) shall apply in instances where the employee is dismissed upon 
reaching the agreed or normal retirement age, but not in cases where the employer has permitted 
the employee to remain in the workforce after reaching the normal or agreed retirement age. It has 
been held that, if the employer expressly or tacitly permits the employee to continue to work after 
reaching a normal or agreed retirement age, that the employer then waives its right to enforce 
section 187(2)(b) at will.152 This appears to be the correct approach. When interpreting any 
legislation, one must also bear in mind the supremacy of the Constitution.153 In order for a right, 
such as the right to fair labour practices or the right to choose one’s trade or profession, to be 
limited, it must pass the constitutional scrutiny of section 36 of the Constitution.154  
 
It was correctly pointed out in the Labour Appeal Court that a certain age may not become the 
normal retirement age merely by virtue of the employer’s say so.155 Accordingly, JP Zondo, as he 
then was, found that the employer may not institute a unilateral change in relation to the normal 
retirement age and upheld the Labour Court’s decision that the dismissal amounted to an automatic 
unfair dismissal. 156 
 
In South African law, therefore, it is clear that there are only two ways to justify a compulsory 
retirement age, firstly by way of agreeing to a retirement age by way of collective agreement or by 
way of an employment contract, or secondly, by reaching a normal retirement age. It was held that 
“the provision relating to the normal retirement age only applies where there is no agreed retirement 
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age between the employer and the employee”.157 Therefore, the normal retirement age becomes 
practice. 
 
However, the court in Wanless v Fidelity (Pty) Limited,158 relied heavily on the terms of the 
employment contract and found that the dismissal based on age was fair in terms of section 
187(2)(b). It is incumbent that, when interpreting any provision, a “sensible meaning must be 
preferred to one that leads to insensible or un-business like results or undermines the apparent 
purpose of the document”.159 Considering the above, as well as the point made earlier by way of 
the Harkson v Lane case,160 it is re-iterated that the effect that a compulsory retirement age has on 
elderly employees nearing retirement should be emphasised. Based on the aforementioned case 
law, the inconsistency in the application of section 187(2)(b), as well as in determining a normal 
retirement age, is alarming. It is submitted that this inconsistency is the cause of the prejudice 
suffered by older employees and that objective and standardised criteria should be put in place to 
counter these inconsistent outcomes. 
 
It is on this basis that the study turns to the application of the Harkson v Lane test on the contentious 
section 187(2)(b). When determining discrimination, the Harkson v Lane test requires that it must 
first be establish whether the provision differentiates. In terms of section 187(2)(b) the answer is 
in the affirmative, as it differentiates between persons who have reached the agreed or normal 
retirement age and persons who have not. The next step is to determine whether the differentiation 
amounts to unfair discrimination. Once again the answer is in the affirmative in relation to section 
187(2)(b), as it discriminates against those who have reached the normal and agreed retirement age 
and those who have not. Therefore, it is clear that the reason for the discrimination is arbitrary. 
Consequently, those who fall within the ambit of section 187(2)(b) have a remedy, while those who 
fall outside the ambit of the provision are left without protection. Accordingly, unfair 
discrimination is apparent. Lastly, after having established that the provision unfairly discriminates 
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based on reaching the normal or agreed retirement age, the question that remains is whether the 
discrimination is based on any of the listed grounds. Once again, this answer is in the affirmative 
because the discrimination is based on age. On the strength of the Harkson v Lane test, it appears 
that section 187(2)(b) may amount to unfair discrimination in some cases. 
 
Section 187(2)(b) may however be justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.161 This 
section provides that a right may be limited in terms of a law in general application, in this specific 
instance the Labour Relations Act, to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom taking into account 
relevant factors, such as: the nature of the right; the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
the nature and extent of the limitation; the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose. It is evident from the wording of the limitation clause, 
that section 187(2)(b) may pass constitutional muster if the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation is considered. This is so because, in the case of limiting the rights of elderly employees, 
the promotion of economic development by creating new job opportunities and providing a balance 
between the generations are important purposes for the limitation of the right.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
Section 187(2)(b) provides for a mandatory retirement age in South Africa which, on the face of it, 
already raises certain issues. This chapter showed that the ILO is striving to implement measures 
to promote flexible retirement and recognises that if an elderly worker is capable of working 
productively, he or she should be allowed to continue working. Furthermore, arguments in favour 
of a retirement age, although useful for purposes of combating youth unemployment, were seen to 
be flawed, while more emphasis should be placed on skills development. Strong arguments are 
made for competency-based approaches, so that dismissals are based on actual incapacity rather 
than age. It is submitted that high unemployment is largely due to a lack of education. Nevertheless, 
whatever physical frailties an elderly employee might possess, they make up for in experience. It 
was argued that section 187(2)(b) of the LRA is discriminatory in nature by providing an employer 
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with the right to terminate an employment contract by virtue of the employee reaching a normal or 
agreed retirement age. The chapter also illustrated that the interpretation of the words “normal” 
and “agreed” have proved problematic for the courts. In addition, the chapter highlighted the 
criticism on whether a dismissal based on age should be seen as a dismissal, or rather as the 
termination of an employment contract due to the effluxion of time. However, it is submitted that 
these terms should be interpreted based on the facts of each case by taking into account the relevant 
industry practices and company policies. 
 
This chapter set out the discriminatory elements of section 187(2)(b) by evaluating the impact of 
the EEA on this provision. Age is one of the listed grounds that an employee may rely on when 
claiming an automatic unfair dismissal. In terms of automatic unfair dismissals, the onus rests on 
the employer to prove that the alleged discrimination is fair. Accordingly, the chapter highlighted 
the onus of proof in discrimination cases, as well as dismissal matters. The LRA requires a shifting 
onus. Firstly, the employee must establish a dismissal. Secondly, once the dismissal has been 
established, the onus shifts to the employer to prove that the dismissal was in fact fair. The chapter 
emphasised the three remedies afforded to employees in terms of the LRA, namely, re-instatement, 
re-employment and compensation. Re-employment is seen as the primary remedy afforded to the 
successful applicants. It was stressed that, in terms of automatic unfair dismissals, more 
compensation can be awarded than to those who claim unfair dismissal under section 186 of the 
LRA.  
 
The chapter illustrated that, with regard to retirement, South African labour laws do not comply 
with its international obligations. The ILO was compared to our EEA and LRA, in order to 
understand the nature of these discrepancies. The numerous conflicting judgments regarding the 
interpretation of section 187(2)(b) provides an avenue for employers to exploit elderly employees. 
This goes against the aim of the ILO to make the transition from work to retirement a dignified 
process. The chapter also addressed the regional framework in terms of retirement regulation by 
taking a closer look at the SADC Treaty. However, due to incidences of corruption and 
maladministration in the Sub-Saharan African countries, the SADC Treaty is of little practical 
effect. 
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CHAPTER 3: LESSONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS: A COMPARISON WITH SPAIN 
AND GERMANY 
3.1 Introduction 
In the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries, the labour market largely consists of informal 
employment and therefore the issue of retirement only rarely comes to the fore.162 This is in stark 
contrast with Spain and Germany. With their origins rooted in the era of the Roman Empire, these 
first-world European countries are more experienced in the regulation of retirement than their 
African counterparts.163 Spain has one of the highest youth unemployment rates in Europe, while 
Germany has one of the lowest.164  
 
Bearing in mind that section 39 of the Constitution mandates the consideration of international law 
and permits the consideration of foreign law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, this chapter 
compares the best practices of these two jurisdictions.165 Furthermore, the Labour Appeal Court in 
NEHAWU v UCT166 found that the interpretation of European Union Directives by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) could be of particular value to South African courts when interpreting 
legislative provisions that are similar in content to those of the directives. Therefore, this chapter 
considers the similarities between the EEA and the EU Directive regarding equal treatment in 
employment.167  
 
In the discussion of the similarities between the EEA and the EU Directive, various cases heard by 
the ECJ are also considered and the study explores the extent to which these cases can offer 
guidance in a South African context. Some cases are particularly important in the assessment of 
the justifiability of these measures. For instance, in Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios 
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SA,168 the ECJ held that the aim of promoting access to employment by means 
of better distribution of work between the generations may, in principle, be regarded 
as “objectively and reasonably” justifiable,169 and in Gerhard Fuchs v Land Hessen,170 the ECJ 
considered the fact that a person becomes entitled to a pension upon reaching a mandatory 
retirement age.171 
 
3.2 EU Council Directive 2000/78 
Article 18 of the Directive provides that member states must adopt the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive by no later than the 2nd of 
December 2003.172 Both Spain and Germany are member states of the EU and are therefore bound 
to incorporate this Directive into their national legislation. The Directives are the main tool of the 
EU to harmonise the national laws of the member states.173 The purpose of the Directive is to 
provide a general framework for combating discrimination based on certain listed grounds, such 
age, religion, sexual orientation, belief or disability, to name a few, in an employment and 
occupational context.174 Furthermore, the Directive provides that there may be no discrimination, 
directly or indirectly, based on the aforementioned grounds.175  
 
Similarly, our Employment Equity Act, (hereinafter “EEA”) states that its purpose is to achieve 
equality in the workplace by promoting equal opportunities and fair treatment, as well as 
implementing affirmative action measures.176 The purpose of these sources is not the only thing 
that the EEA and the Directive have in common. The EEA and the Directive also have practically 
identical grounds prohibiting direct and indirect discrimination.177 This can be seen as a method in 
which South Africa is applying international labour standards and giving effect to the duty in terms 
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of section 39 of the Constitution. As discussed later in this chapter, both Spain and Germany are 
required to adopt such laws, however, they follow different approaches when it comes to applying 
the principles of the Directives. 
 
“Transposing legislation” is when member states use legislation to enact EU Directives into their 
national law.178 The Spanish Workers Statute is an example of such transposing legislation which 
is used to implement Directive 2000/78 into Spanish law.179 Article 4(2) of the Workers Statute 
states that workers have the right, not to be discriminated against, directly or indirectly on the basis 
of sex, marital status, age within the limits, and the like, when seeking employment or once 
employed.180 Once again, this is similar to South Africa’s EEA.181  
 
In contrast to South Africa, the Spanish legislature provides that a mandatory retirement age may 
only be agreed upon in terms of a collective agreement, rather than as part of their employment 
contract.182 The EU Directive, unlike the Spanish legislature, makes provision for terms in 
employment contracts, as well as in collective agreements.183 In terms of the Tenth Additional 
provision to the Workers Statute,184 collective agreements may contain clauses providing for the 
termination of employment because a worker has reached the normal retirement age stipulated in 
social security legislation. Provided that these requirements are met, he or she will be entitled to a 
retirement pension under his or her contribution scheme.185 
 
3.3 Felix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA 
The European Court of Justice adjudicated upon a Spanish case, namely Felix Palacios de la Villa 
v Cortefiel Servicios SA, which dealt with the generational imbalance issue that may arise within 
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the labour force if there is no retirement cap. This generational imbalance has been referred to as 
the “double bind” principle.186 The principle mainly entails balancing the interests of older and 
younger generations – the former attempting to make the transition from work to retirement, while 
the latter is entering the labour market for the first time.187 When considering the justification for 
a compulsory retirement age in Spain, it was opined in the Felix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel 
Servicios SA that the Spanish legislature introduced this measure because of the country’s 
economic background, which is characterised by high unemployment rates, and accordingly the 
mandatory retirement age was used to “absorb” unemployment.188 
 
The ECJ held that the aim of promoting access to employment by means of a better distribution of 
work between generations, may, in principle, be regarded as “objectively and reasonably” 
justifiable.189 Emphasis is placed on measures that are objectively and reasonably justifiable, as 
this directly correlates with article 6 of EU Directive 2000/78.190 The court pointed out that the 
Spanish legislature has moved away from a compulsory retirement age to a far more flexible 
approach in respect of retirement regulation.191 The court highlighted, however, that it is imperative 
to distinguish between differences in treatment which are justified by way of legitimate 
employment policy and labour market or vocational training objectives, and discrimination which 
is unjust and should be prohibited.192 It is submitted that in terms of European law, the 
encouragement of recruitment is undoubtedly a legitimate aim in social policy.193 As previously 
mentioned, during the period of 1980 and 2001, compulsory retirement of workers who had reached 
a certain age was used by the Spanish legislature to absorb unemployment.194 The Palacios 
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judgment reflects a positive position in relation to a compulsory retirement age, but also stresses 
the importance that the employee’s retirement benefits must accrue to him or her.195 
 
The national court stated that the Spanish legislature went from regarding compulsory retirement 
as an instrument favouring employment policy, to viewing it as a burden on the social security 
system. The legislature therefore decided to replace the policy encouraging compulsory retirement 
with measures promoting the implementation of a flexible retirement system.196 The 
aforementioned requirements have been implemented in order to reduce unemployment, however, 
although these requirements seem positive, they have not borne much fruit. To date, Spain has one 
of the highest youth unemployment rates across Europe. This begs the question whether the new 
flexible approach is in fact the correct way to go. 
 
The court considered “Law 14/2005”, on clauses in collective agreements relating to the attainment 
of normal retirement age, and “Law 14/2001”, relating to the so-called “single transitional 
provision”.197 The court found that “Law 14/2005” was not applicable in that particular matter as 
the collective agreement which was in place at the time of the main proceedings, was concluded 
on the 10th of March 2005 which was before the “14/2005” was adopted and therefore the “single 
transitional provision” was applicable. The transitional provision provides as follows:  
“clauses in collective agreements concluded prior to the entry into force of this Law, which 
provide for the termination of contracts of employment where workers have reached a normal or 
agreed retirement age, shall be lawful provided that it is ensured that the workers concerned have 
completed the minimum period of contributions and satisfy the other requirements laid down in 
social security legislation for entitlement to a retirement pension under their contribution 
regime.”198 
However, the single transitional provision does not require a connection between the compulsory 
retirement of workers and the legitimate employment policy objectives. The court held that the 
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national legislation was not incompatible with the Directive. The court further stated that the 
Directive must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, pursuant to the retirement 
clauses being lawful and that the workers must have satisfied all the requirements set out in their 
social security law.199 Accordingly, the court found that a dismissal based on age was objectively 
and reasonably justifiable. 
 
3.4 Gerhard Fuchs v Land Hessen200 
Article 23 of the German Basic Law, which is akin to a constitution, states that “with a view to 
establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development 
of the European Union that is committed to the democratic, social and federal principles, to the 
rule of law and the principle of subsidiarity and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights 
essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law”.201 These basic rights include the right 
to be equal before the law, the right to freedom of association and the right to occupational 
freedom.202 Similar to the South African Constitution, the German Basic Law places an obligation 
on the German people to acknowledge the inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of 
every community, of peace and justice in the world.203  
 
It is trite in European law that the principle of non-discrimination based on age must be regarded 
as a general principle of EU law.204 Considering the “double bind” principle mentioned earlier, 
there is a need to balance the individual and rights based approaches to age discrimination law on 
the one hand, and the collective and interest based approaches on the other.205 It is against this 
backdrop that this chapter analyses the regulation of retirement law in Germany. In the Gerhard 
Fuchs v Land Hessen case, the legal question which arose was whether the compulsory retirement 
age for permanent civil servants was legitimate and justifiable.206  In this judgment, the court 
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followed “a right to work” approach, which may prove valuable in determining the method to use 
to interpret compulsory retirement clauses.207 In relation to permanent civil servants, German 
national legislation provides for automatic retirement once they have reached the age of 65 years, 
although they may continue to work until 68 years if it is in the interests of the service.208  
 
Determining what is “in the interests of the service” has however often proven to be problematic. 
In terms of the Directive, differences in treatment shall not constitute discrimination if they are 
objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim.209 The court held that in order for the 
measure to be appropriate and necessary, the measure must not be unreasonable in light of the aim 
pursued and must be supported by evidence of probative value.210  
 
It was the court’s opinion that continued employment until the age of 68 years could mitigate the 
law surrounding retirement. The court referred to the Employment Guidelines for 2000 in reaching 
its decision,211 which stressed the need to foster a labour market favourable to social integration by 
formulating a coherent set of policies aimed at combating discrimination. These policies are akin 
to those requirements set out in the Spanish Workers Statute used to promote legitimate aims and 
justifying compulsory retirement. The Allegemeines Gleichbehandelgezets is the national 
legislation adopted in German law which acts as the transposing legislation giving effect to the 
Council Directive on equal treatment in employment and occupation.212 Paragraph 15(16) of the 
Lander law states that “permanent civil servants shall retire on reaching the retirement age”.213 
 
In most compulsory retirement disputes it becomes apparent that the competency of the worker or 
employee differs from one employee to the next and that the type of work or field in which the 
employee or worker finds himself often determines whether it would be in the interests of the 
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service to have the employee remain in the employment relationship. Therefore, the test is 
individualistic. This is problematic because, in most disputes relating to discrimination, one of the 
remedies would be to apply an objective and standard criterion to eliminate the issue of 
discrimination. However, retirement is not a one size fits all problem and requires a much more in-
depth approach into the needs and capabilities of each individual employee within the labour 
market context he or she finds themselves.  
 
Public employees in Germany are categorised and each category has a compulsory age at which 
they are required to retire based on the interests of the sector in which they find themselves. For 
example, teachers shall retire in the last month on which they reach the age of 65.214 In the Lander, 
which is akin to our provinces, the provincial legislature shall determine the retirement age for the 
sector in question. This can be seen as a unique approach to establishing objective criteria in order 
to determine a suitable and equitable retirement age, by taking into account the interests of the 
employee in that specific sector.  
 
In an attempt to adapt to the needs of the ageing labour market, and to better serve the interests of 
the employer, employers in Germany tend to employ persons who have reached their normal 
retirement age on fixed term contracts.215 The European Court of Justice recognised that such 
legislation is aimed at older unemployed workers who are experiencing difficulties in finding 
employment. However, the court stated that this measure goes beyond what is appropriate and 
necessary to attain the legitimate aim which is objectively pursued.216 The National Court in the 
Gerhard Fuchs v Land Hessen matter, expressed its doubts over the compulsory age of 65 years 
for public prosecutors and felt that it may result in discrimination, as set out in article 6(1) of the 
Council Directive.217  
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The distinct competing interests here are clear. On the one hand, it is the economic and productivity 
interests of the employer, while on the other hand there are the interests of the ageing employee 
seeking financial security in the latter part of his or her life. Accordingly, a consistent measure or 
criteria should be applied when determining whether the legitimate aim is truly reasonable and 
justifiable. 
 
Accordingly, this was one of the issues which was referred to the ECJ for determination. The 
national court came to this conclusion by considering the societal context at the time. At the time, 
it was believed that fitness for work declines after reaching the age of 65 years. This was however 
later disproved and it was found that each person’s fitness to work varies. One must place a caveat 
on relying too much on statistical analysis. Statistics may provide a general depiction of the sosio-
economic situation, but may not be a true reflection of the specific employee who is facing 
automatic unemployment due to a mandatory retirement age. 
 
The ECJ was also tasked with determining the specific requirements when establishing the 
reasonableness and suitability of a retirement age within the context of the German law.218 The 
court has held that “legitimate aims” are those that further or are in the public interest. The question 
however arose whether a regional provision could be in the public interest – the court answered 
this question in the affirmative. The court held that, although on the face of it, the national law 
seemed to lack coherence when providing for instance – if in the interests of the service – to extend 
the normal retirement age to 68, it did not, because in this particular matter there were legitimate 
aims which were pursued.219 
 
In the private sector, employers and employees may set an agreed retirement age in either the 
contract of employment, or through collective agreement. This is unlike the position in Spain where 
one can only agree on a compulsory retirement age if it falls within a collective agreement and not 
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in terms of an employment contract.220 As pointed out earlier, in Germany’s public sector, 
retirement ages are determined by the province (Lander) in which you are employed, whereas in 
Spain no such categories exist. It may be argued that these categories are essential to the low 
unemployment rate, which is characteristic of Germany, and may act as an example to Spain, which 
has one of the highest unemployment rates in Europe. These differences seem slightly strange as 
both these countries are member states of the EU and both are required to apply the Council 
Directive on equal treatment in employment and occupation. These countries’ labour legislation 
however provide vastly different outcomes.   
 
The German government defended the system of automatic termination of an employment contract 
on reaching the normal retirement age, by using the notion of sharing employment between the 
generations.221 A similar justification was used in the previously discussed Felix Palacios judgment 
and is also apparent in German law. Emphasis was placed on the connection between the non-
discrimination principle and the right to work, which is encompassed in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU. Furthermore, the prohibition on discrimination on the grounds of age must be 
read in light of the right to engage in work.222 Although much emphasis is placed on the general 
principle of discrimination, the European courts seem to give employers significant leeway in 
enforcing compulsory retirement packages. 
 
The international sphere, by way of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
has implemented certain measures for age related reform, such as increasing the official retirement 
age.223 The report set out by the OECD in 2019 identifies three key objectives: firstly, “rewarding 
work and later retirement,” secondly, “encouraging employers to retain and hire older workers” 
and lastly, “promoting the employability of workers throughout their working lives.”224 It is 
submitted that these objectives, on the face of it, are in line with the Council Directive 78/2000 on 
                                                          
220 Manfredi and Vickers (n 187) above. 
221 Rosenbladt v Oellerking Gebaudereinigungsges mbH (C – 45/09) ECR 2010 at par 43. 
222 a 15 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (2000/C 364/01); see Torsten Hörnfeldt v Posten Meddelande 
(C – 141/11) at par 37. 
223 OECD Working Better with Age, Ageing and Employment Policies (2019). 
224 OECD Working Better with Age, Ageing and Employment Policies (n 223) 10. 
39 
 
equal treatment in occupation and employment. However, considering the high youth 
unemployment rates in South Africa, these objectives, if used in the South African context, may 
do more harm than good. It is therefore reiterated that the generational balance should be 
emphasised between the old seeking to remain in the labour market and the young seeking first 
time employment.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Both Spain and Germany tend to follow a pro-active approach by implementing the Council 
Directive in a manner which promotes the right to engage in work as set out by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the European Union. It is submitted that the EU Directive provides far more 
clarity than the LRA’s section 187(2)(b), with respect to the fairness of a dismissal based on 
reaching an agreed or normal retirement age. The Directive promotes a balancing act between the 
generations by ensuring that retirement ages are only put in place and enforced if it serves an 
objective and legitimate aim. As discussed above, the promotion of a legitimate aim provides prima 
facie proof that the dismissal of an employee based on age is fair. After considering the retirement 
regulation in both Spain and Germany, it is submitted that a similar approach should be followed 
in the South African context. It is important to highlight that, according to the aim of the ECJ in 
the Felix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servivos SA, to promote access to employment by means 
of a better distribution of work between the generations, may, in principle, be regarded as 
“objectively and reasonably” justifiable. 
 
The LRA should reduce the ambiguity which surrounds section 187(2)(b) by either implementing 
Labour Codes setting out how to deal with persons nearing an agreed retirement age, or by means 
of a provision supporting the legitimate aims of retirement, such as those mentioned before, so as 
to narrow the generational gap and promote economic development. It is important to note that 
even European law has not had much support for a competency-based approach when it comes to 
retirement. Section 187(2)(b) has certainly been the cause of much debate, especially in cases 
where an employee has not agreed to, nor reached a normal retirement age. Accordingly, the 
methods used in both Spain and Germany, taking into account the provisions laid out in the EU 
Directive, is of vital importance for the future of retirement law in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
Our comprehensive and supreme Constitution provides for extensive protection relating to the 
human rights contained in our Bill of Rights. This study illustrated the interconnectedness between 
the rights to human dignity, equality, social security and fair labour practices and how these rights 
directly relate to the constitutionality of a mandatory retirement age in South Africa. Although each 
of these rights are quite significant, much of this is lost in the enforcement of these rights. 
Notwithstanding that the right against unfair age discrimination is equal to the right not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of, for example gender or sexual orientation, in practice age 
discrimination seems to be regarded as a lesser ground of discrimination. However, as the study 
reflected, all these fundamental rights may be limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
Having regard to the Constitution and the limitations clause, the study embarked on a process of 
establishing whether section 187(2)(b) may be limited. Taking into account the lessons learned 
from other jurisdictions, as well as the contemporary legal framework, certain conclusions and 
recommendations can be made. 
 
4.2 Conclusions 
The LRA provides that a dismissal based on age is fair if the person has reached the normal or 
agreed retirement age. The lack of clarity within this provision creates a question as to what 
happens in circumstances where the employer and employee have not agreed on the normal 
retirement age. This leads to the exploitation of vulnerable elderly workers. In order to provide 
better protection for retired persons, social assistance grants, by way of the old-age grant has been 
implemented by the South African legislature. Social security measures, such as the aforesaid, aim 
to assist the most vulnerable individuals in society, however, challenges arise in terms of our 
means-based approach which is limited in scope and provides low benefits. This ultimately places 
these vulnerable persons in positions of poverty or with inadequate income to sustain a living. 
Although our old-age grant has proved to be the most successful social security measure, it is still 
not providing adequate protection for the ageing population. An alarming conclusion is that our 
labour legislation is not entirely compliant with our international obligations. Section 187(2)(b) 
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may be seen as a method for employers to dismiss employees on the basis that they have reached 
a certain age, rather than promoting the elderly to work for longer and retain their skills and 
experience to boost the economy. In accordance with the ILO, retirement should be flexible and 
the transition from a working life to a retired life should be voluntary.  
 
Having highlighted the prejudice suffered by these elderly employees, the study discussed the 
unfair discrimination which is apparent in terms of section 187(2)(b) of the LRA. The unequivocal 
right to equality, which is given effect to by the Employment Equity Act, was evaluated based on 
age. Considering the above, discrimination seems to be apparent in terms of section 187(2)(b) and 
the study concludes that, after applying the Harksen v Lane test, the provision in fact amounts to 
unfair discrimination. However, the discrimination may be reasonable and justifiable in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution, if it is found that the purpose of the limitation specifically promotes 
the economy by creating new job opportunities and reduces an already alarming rate of youth 
unemployment in South Africa. However, the aforesaid argument does not seem to yield much 
fruit as the core reasons for unemployment tend to be lack of education and skills. It is therefore 
concluded that, although a competency-based approach to retirement may be fair, in South Africa, 
as well as internationally, this approach has not been well supported. Accordingly, section 
187(2)(b) justifiably limits the right to equality, however, the problem lies in the inconsistency in 
which section 187(2)(b) is applied. 
 
A comparative analysis between the retirement regulations in Spain and Germany showed 
similarities between certain EEA provisions and the provisions set out in the EU Directive on equal 
treatment in employment and occupation. It was pointed out that South Africa is obligated to 
consider international law and may consider foreign law in terms of the Constitution. Clear 
similarities were identified between the EU Directive and South Africa’s Employment Equity Act. 
Both Spain and Germany provide pro-active approaches to employment by mandating retirement 
ages in collective agreements or employment contracts in order to further legitimate aims such as 
economic development and the furtherance of youth employment. Although Spain and Germany 
follow vastly different approaches to retirement, they both stress the need for retirement in society 
to provide a balance between the generations within an employment law context. The ECJ in the 
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Felix Palacios judgment held that the aim of promoting better access to employment by means of 
a better distribution of work between the generations, may in principle be regarded as “objectively 
and reasonably” justifiable. Only if the discrimination constitutes a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is 
proportionate, will it not amount to an unfair dismissal. If one should apply this in a South African 
context, the legitimate aim would be to further economic development. However, an employer 
would not be able to fairly dismiss an employee based on age if there are already sufficient youth 
employment in the company and sufficient measures to promote economic development.  
 
4.3 Recommendations 
Due to the individual nature of the inquiry, the dissertation recommends that, when a dispute arises 
relating to the dismissal of an employee in terms of section 187(2)(b), one should look at the 
employer’s subjective motive for the dismissal. If the motive is based purely on age, it is suggested 
that the dismissal should be automatically unfair based on unfair age discrimination. The confusion 
relating to section 187(2)(b) is because it falls under a dismissal rather than termination due to the 
effluxion of time. Consequently, the legislature should rather reconsider the context of section 
187(2)(b). Another approach is to focus on the incapacity of the employee, rather than a factor 
which he or she is unable to control such as age. Employees faced with the reality that their work 
is not up to scratch, are far less likely to dispute their retirement than employees who have 
performed all their duties but are forced to retire. This approach may prove to be far less costly and 
more efficient. The LRA already provides for a procedure to dismiss an employee on the basis of 
incapacity and the same rules should apply in the so-called section 187(2)(b) cases. This approach 
would facilitate economic growth by providing skills and experience within the workplace, 
promote flexible retirement and increase the number of productive elderly workers who may impart 
their knowledge and expertise upon the younger generation. 
 
Another approach that may be beneficial to South Africa, is to provide mandatory retirement ages 
in specific sectors, similar to the German civil service, in order to ensure uniformity and also cater 
for the individualistic characteristics of retirement. Legitimate aims are aims that further or are in 
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the public interest. German law emphasises the connection between non-discrimination and the 
right to work. Although there is no express right to work in South Africa, this may be an avenue to 
pursue to provide better protection for workers.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This study considered section 187(2)(b), not only from a constitutional perspective, but also from 
an international and contemporary legal framework perspective. It has been concluded that section 
187(2)(b) may be discriminatory in nature, but nevertheless passes the Harksen v Lane test, as well 
as the limitation clause test in terms of the Constitution. The fundamental issues that the study has 
identified with regard to section 187(2)(b) are the inconsistent interpretation of the words “agreed” 
and “normal” retirement age, the incorrect connotation to the word “dismissal” and the increased 
vulnerability of elderly workers. The study therefore recommends that the issue be approached as 
a normal dismissal based on incapacity, rather than in terms of section 187(2)(b). 
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